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1. Introduction  
Mudharabah is a type of financing contract that 
relies on a profit and loss sharing scheme offered 
by Islamic Banks (IBs) in Indonesia. It plays a 
crucially important role in stimulating 
entrepreneurs' growth compared to other offered 
products from IBs (Hassan & Kayed, 2009). Hence, 
it is considered that the mudharabah based 
financial products may contribute to real economic 
and business practices within the community. 
However, the portion of mudharabah transactions 
in Indonesian Islamic Banks is the smallest 
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This study aims to examine the determinants of Islamic banks’ compliance with the 
statement of financial accounting standards (SFAS) No.105 on Mudharabah 
principles. Using the purposive sampling technique, the samples of this study are 
Indonesian Islamic Banks (IBs) between 2009 and 2017 (96 observations). The data 
were analyzed using panel data regression. The results show a significant positive 
influence of the effectiveness of the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB), the 
effectiveness of audit committees, tenure of CFO, and third party funds from the 
Mudharabah contract for the compliance level of the IBs financial reports with SFAS 
No.105. Meanwhile, the CFO educational background has a significant negative effect 
and institutional ownership did not have any significant effect on the compliance level. 
Thus, to attain a higher level of compliance with SFAS 105, the Indonesian IBs must 
improve the quality of the reporting system monitor through the effectiveness of SSB 
and the audit committees. 
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compared to those other shariah based products, for 
instance, murabahah and musyarakah schemes. 
Based on the Islamic banking performance report 
issued by the Indonesian financial service authority 
(Otoritas Jasa Keuangan – OJK), the portion of 
mudharabah financing was only 4.8% in 2018. It 
decreased by -6.78% compared to 2017 (OJK, 
2018).  
Prior studies have identified the reasons 
behind the causes of the low mudharabah 
financing portion. Among the reason are high risk 
and uncertainty (Adnan & Purwoko, 2013; Diallo, 
Fitrijanti, & Tanzil., 2015; Warninda, Ekaputra, & 
Rokhim, 2019) and a high moral hazard possibility 
(Yousfi, 2013). To minimize these risks, adequate 
transparency of financial information is needed 
(Bushman & Smith, 2001; Fuchs, Ory, & 
Skrypacz, 2016). One form of transparency carried 
out by IBs is the sufficient information disclosure 
on mudharabah financing in their financial 
reports. 
For stakeholders, the disclosure on 
mudharabah transactions in IBs is crucial 
information as it provides an overview of the 
bank's risk conditions. According to  Amalina Wan 
Abdullah, Percy, & Stewart (2013), information 
related to mudharabah investment in IBs still 
needs improvement through a proper reporting 
system. In Indonesia, the accounting treatment for 
mudharabah transactions is regulated in 
pernyatan standar akuntansi keuangan/ PSAK 
105 (or statement of financial accounting standard/ 
SFAS). The standard provides the guide for 
recognition, measurement, presentation, and 
disclosure of mudharabah transactions. The full 
adoption of SFAS 105 with mudharabah 
investment among companies potentially 
increases transparency, reliability, and greater 
comparability concerning mudharabah 
transactions in Islamic banking. 
 Mukhlisin, Hudaib, & Azid (2015) concluded 
that the uniformity of financial disclosure and 
reporting standards for Islamic financial 
institutions can facilitate better evaluation and 
strategic decision makings, and thus, the 
advancement of Islamic financial institutions. 
Meanwhile, Sellami & Tahari (2017) believe that 
information disclosure is very important for 
stakeholders as they need to assess risks that may 
occur and how these risks are managed by the 
company. 
Furthermore, stakeholders also demand 
financial transparency and performance 
information. Higher transparency can be achieved 
by ensuring financial reports are fully comply with 
applicable accounting standards, for example, the 
information about dewan pengawas syariah (or 
Shariah Supervisory Board/SSB). Elamer, Ntim,  
Abdou & Pyke (2019) found that the existence of 
an SSB contributes to improved disclosure in 
Islamic banks. Besides, the presence of the SSB 
can also strengthen the effectiveness of the 
implementation of governance and accounting 
reforms for the sake of better compliance level of 
IBs business with the shariah provisions. 
According to Law No. 21 of 2008 regarding 
Islamic banking, the role of SSB is not only to 
oversee the compliance of banking activities to the 
Islamic jurisprudence but also advice directors 
regarding the implementation of Islamic banking 
rules.  
However, Grassa, Chakroum, & Hussainey 
(2018) discovered that SSB also plays a role in the 
information disclosure of Islamic banking 
products and services. To optimize their role, SSB 
has formulated strategies to promote a culture of 
bank compliance, formulate compliance policies 
or principles, and establish compliance systems 
and procedures that are used to formulate bank 
internal rules and guidelines to minimize 
compliance risk (Bank Indonesia, 2011).  
Therefore, the role of SSB is significant in 
maintaining all operational activities including 
financial reporting prepared by Islamic banks 
following shariah principles. Farook, Hassan, & 
Lanis  (2011) demonstrated a positive relationship 
between SSB governance and the level of financial 
report compliance. 
257 
Hakim & Sulhani/Jurnal Dinamika Akuntansi dan Bisnis Vol. 7(2), 2020 pp 255-272 
 
 
 
A chief financial officer (CFO) also plays a 
decisive role in the level of compliance with the 
applicable accounting standard. Ge, Matsumoto, 
& Li Zhang (2011) unveiled that CFO style affects 
accounting choices as well as firm disclosure 
choices. The CFO style in determining accounting 
choices is strongly influenced by the demographic 
profiles of the CFOs such as gender, age, and 
educational background. Moreover, Geiger & 
North (2006) uncovered that companies with 
newly appointed CFOs have lower discretionary 
accruals than companies managed by a longer 
tenure of CFOs. CFOs also play the role of 
reporting mediation to directors and other top 
management (Milana & Maldaon, 2015).  
They are also responsible for all financial 
transactions within the company, which is 
managing the company's fiscal activities and 
ensuring the compliance of the company 
accounting system with the accounting principles 
and standards set by regulators. In terms of 
maintaining the reputation of the company, CFO 
often withholds bad news that potentially harm 
company reputation (Kothari, Shu, & Wysocki, 
2009). This is closely related to its role in 
managing the company's financial information to 
provide a positive signal for all company 
stakeholders. 
Apart from CFO and SSB, another important 
aspect that shapes a company’s financial reporting 
is the audit committee. The existence and 
effectiveness of audit committees can contribute to 
the improvement of quality and compliance of the 
company's financial reporting (Glaum, Schmidt, 
Street, & Vogel, 2013; Mutmainnah & Wardhani, 
2013).  An intensive and proper supervision 
undertaken audit committee may reduce the 
existence of fraud in financial statements. The 
audit committee not only provides an internal 
oversight but also helps the auditors to maintain 
their independence because long-term audit 
engagements can reduce auditor independence. 
Other research conducted by Al-Akra, Eddie, & 
Ali (2010) and Sellami & Tahari (2017) also 
supports the conclusion that the audit committee 
stimulates the improvement of compliance level of 
corporate financial reporting on financial 
accounting standards. 
The transparency of company information is 
often associated with stakeholder pressure on the 
need for this information. Stakeholder pressure is 
an important part that can affect financial 
reporting quality in achieving reporting objectives 
so that it can provide information on various 
parties who have different interests. Information 
on Mudharabah transaction is carried out by 
considering the existence of the main stakeholder. 
Information disclosure is also a part of the 
mechanism to gain legitimacy. In other words, the 
company carries out financial reporting due to 
pressure from certain stakeholders to attain 
community legitimacy. Jayanti & Mutmainah 
(2013) found that stakeholder pressure may lead to 
the extension of company information disclosure. 
Thus, to reach an ideal level of transparency, 
companies need sufficient pressure from certain 
stakeholders, especially in the Islamic bank 
industry.  
Previous research related to the compliance 
level of Islamic banks with accounting standards 
conducted by Sellami & Tahari (2017) who 
examined the influence of audit committee, listing 
status, type of auditor, age, size, and country of 
origins for the Islamic banks’ compliance level on 
accounting standards proposed by AAOIFI and 
IFRS. Other studies were conducted non in the 
setting of Islamic banking as the studies focused 
more on companies’ compliance on certain 
accounting standards and international disclosure 
regulations (Street & Gray, 2002 dan Hodgdon, 
Tondkar, Adhikari, & Harless, 2009). In addition, 
previous research measured the level of 
compliance with Islamic banks using several 
reporting items contained in AAOIFI FAS 
including mudharabah, murabahah, zakat, and 
SSB (Vinnicombe, 2010; dan Sarea, 2012). Unlike 
prior studies, this study investigates more 
specifically the compliance of Indonesian Islamic 
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banks on the mudharabah accounting standards 
(as regulated in SFAS 105). Besides, new 
variables that have not been examined before are 
being tested in this study. The variables are 
characteristics of the CFO and stakeholder 
pressure as measured by third-party funds from the 
mudharabah contract.  
CFO variable is an important factor in the case 
of Islamic banking because CFO has a role as a 
supervisor of the quality of the company's 
financial statements if there is a discrepancy in the 
financial statements indicating that the CFO has 
failed to carry out the monitoring function (Feng, 
Ge, Luo, & Sevlin, 2011). Meanwhile, Freeman & 
David (1983) concluded that stakeholders can 
influence company actions/ performance, so 
stakeholder pressure can also increase the scope of 
information disclosure related to mudharabah 
transactions in Islamic banking.  
Therefore, the objective of this study is to 
examine the influence of CFO characteristics, the 
effectiveness of the audit committee and SSB and 
stakeholder pressure for the Islamic bank 
compliance level with the SFAS 105 on 
mudharabah principles and accounting standards. 
The next section reviews the recent works of 
literature on the compliance level of companies 
toward applicable accounting standards. Section 
III provides information related to the research 
design: sample, operationalization of variables, 
and data analysis method. Section IV shows the 
interpretation of data analysis and discussion of 
findings. Lastly, section V provides the main 
conclusion of this study followed by further 
research agenda for the research topic. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
development 
Characteristics of CFO and the compliance level 
with the SFAS 105 
CFO is a person who directs the company's 
operational activities, including risk management 
and financial reporting. According to the Upper 
Echelons Theory, company performance is a 
reflection of the characteristics of the company's 
top management (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). One 
form of company performance is the company's 
financial reporting performance. CFO as part of the 
company's top management has a very important 
role in improving the quality of company reporting.  
Geiger & North (2006) found that the quality 
of the company's financial statements will improve 
if the company's CFO does not have an individual 
interest in the company. Hence, the CFO decides on 
corporate reporting is purely based on his or her 
knowledge and experience without being distorted 
by his or her interests. Kim, Kitsabunnarat, 
Noftsinger (2007)  argued that the length of tenure 
a CFO has contributed to the improvement of 
financial statement quality. This is because the 
tenure of top management reflects a maturity in 
decision making and knowledge of internal control 
risks. 
In addition to the CFO tenure that represents 
experience and knowledge, another factor that 
affects the quality of financial statements is the 
CFO's educational background. This is reinforced 
by previous research which found that the 
educational background of CFO and other top 
management determines the improvement of 
quality of corporate financial reports (Hu, Huang, 
Li & Liu, 2017).  
Top management who has a relevant 
educational background has a positive influence on 
the quality of the report, in this case, the compliance 
of financial statements with a standard or 
regulation. Ge et al., (2011) also concluded that the 
educational background of top management can 
influence the accounting choices made, thereby 
affecting the level of transparency of company 
information. Based on this description, the 
following hypotheses are proposed: 
H1a: CFO tenure has a positive effect on the level of 
compliance with SFAS 105. 
H1b: CFO educational background has a positive 
effect on the level of compliance with SFAS 105. 
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Effectiveness of the audit committee and level of 
compliance with SFAS 105 
Bédard, Chtourou, & Courteau (2004) define 
the audit committee as a committee whose duty is 
to oversee the performance of the board of directors 
and to protect the interests of shareholders. Many 
prior studies have been conducted to investigate the 
role of the audit committee in the corporate 
reporting system. According to research Carcello, 
Hollingsworth, Klein, & Neal (2011) and Felo, 
Krishnamurthy, & Solieri (2005)  the expertise 
possessed by the audit committee can improve the 
quality of financial information reported by the 
company. This means, with its expertise the audit 
committee can mitigate unintended actions of 
management, and thus, it leads to the improvement 
of the compliance of the company's financial 
statements. 
DeZoort & Salterio (2001) study found that 
audit committees with a lot of experience support 
auditors than management. The expertise of the 
audit committee can be seen from the experience 
and certification they have. Farber (2005) revealed 
the characteristics of companies that manipulate 
financial statements, namely, low expertise of the 
audit committee and a few numbers of audit 
committee meetings.  
The complexity of the problems in accounting 
and auditing faced by companies urgently requires 
audit committee members who have expertise in 
accounting and finance (Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 
2004). In addition, research conducted by Sharma 
& Iselin, (2012) found a significant relationship 
between the tenure of the audit committee members 
and the accuracy of financial reporting. Having an 
audit committee, it will make it easier for top 
management and auditors to carry out their duties, 
namely to control and supervise corporate 
governance, especially aligning financial report 
with accounting standards. 
 Research conducted by Sellami & Tahari, 
(2017), Glaum et al., (2013), and Al-Akra et al., 
(2010) found that the audit committee has a 
significant positive effect on the level of 
compliance with accounting standards. Based on 
the description above, the second hypothesis in this 
study is: 
H2: The effectiveness of the audit committee has a 
positive effect on the level of compliance with 
SFAS 105 
 
Stakeholder pressure and level of compliance 
with SFAS 105 
The government is one of the main 
institutional stakeholders of every company. 
Through the formulation of regulations related to 
the reporting system, the government encourages 
companies to improve their reporting system 
quality and accuracy (Henriques & Sadorsky, 
1999). El-Halaby & Hussainey (2016) 
demonstrated how institutional ownership may 
encourage companies to increase the level of 
compliance with shariah accounting standards. In 
addition, the main shareholder in the form of an 
institution will put pressure on Islamic banks to 
disclose complete, transparent, and accountable 
information following applicable standards.  
However, if the main shareholder in an 
Islamic bank is a conventional company as the 
bank's holding company, it will not put great 
pressure on the Islamic bank to be more compliant 
with Islamic accounting standards. However,  
Schadewitz & Blevins (1997) found that there is a 
significant negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and the level of 
compliance with accounting standard disclosures.  
Meanwhile, Farook et al., (2011) revealed that 
Investment Account Holders (IAH) can increase 
company information disclosure. So it can be 
concluded that the higher number of third-party 
funds from mudharabah financing, the higher the 
pressure Islamic banks face ensuring their 
financial reporting compliance on accounting 
standards. Based on this description, the 
hypotheses formulated are as follows: 
H3a: Stakeholder pressure (institutional share 
ownership) has a negative effect on the level of 
compliance with SFAS 105 
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H3b: Stakeholder pressure (third party funds) has a 
positive effect on the level of compliance with 
SFAS 105 
 
SSB effectiveness and level of compliance with 
SFAS 105 
According to Grassa et al., (2018) SSB has an 
active role in authorization whose purpose is to 
control Islamic financial institutions. According to 
Farook et al., (2011) cross-membership at SSB can 
also influence a company's information disclosure 
in its business processes. In addition, cross 
membership is a priority because it can increase 
credibility and knowledge in a team so that SSB 
which has cross membership in its membership can 
explicitly add knowledge on the application of 
existing rules in Islamic Banking and gain insight 
into conducting company supervision. 
 Meanwhile, El-Halaby & Hussainey (2016) 
found that the number of SSB membership will 
increase the effectiveness of control and review of 
all transactions carried out, therefore membership 
and knowledge and experience have more 
implications for the supervisory process of Islamic 
banking. The existence of SSB which is completely 
independent of the intervention of the board of 
directors and executive management can carry out 
its role effectively and efficiently (Garas & Pierce, 
2010) SSB that meets the aspects of independence, 
size, and reputation will be more effective in 
supervising company operations so that they are 
more compliant with Islamic law and comply with 
Islamic accounting standards.  El-Halaby & 
Hussainey (2016) research also concluded that SSB 
has a positive effect on accounting standard 
compliance with Islamic bank financial reports. 
Based on this description, the fourth hypothesis in 
this study is: 
H4: The effectiveness of SSB has a positive effect 
on the level of compliance with SFAS 105 
 
3. Research method 
Research samples 
The sample of this study is Indonesian Islamic 
Commercial Banks which are registered in the 
Indonesian Financial Service Authority (or OJK) 
and have mudharabah financial transactions 
between 2009 and 2017. Another criterion of the 
sample is that the IBs' financial statements have 
been audited by an independent auditor to ensure 
that the information used is free from material 
misstatement. Based on these criteria, the 
following research samples were obtained: 
 
Table 1 Sample Criteria 
No Criteria 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
1 
Registered Islamic Banks and have 
mudharabah based financial products 
6 11 11 11 11 12 12 13 13 
2 
Have not published financial report from 
2009 to 2017 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1) (1) 
3 
Islamic banks provide comprehensive and 
required data for the study 
6 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 
4 
The financial report of Islamic Banks have 
been audited  
6 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 
Observations 6 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 
Outliers 2 
Total observations 96 
Variable operationalization 
Dependent variable 
In this study, the dependent variable is the 
level of compliance with SFAS 105. The 
compliance level is measured by referring to the 
study of Fekete, Matis, & Lukacs (2011). The 
compliance index is formulated using a self-
constructed method by analyzing SFAS 105 and 
Islamic banking financial reports related to the 
mudharabah contract. The results of the self-
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constructed system obtained 13 points related to 
recognition, measurement, presentation, and 
disclosure of SFAS 105, both related to Islamic 
banks as shahibul maal (fund owners) and 
mudarib (fund managers). The measurement of 
this variable uses a proportion calculated by the 
following formula: 
 
Effectiveness of audit committee =  
Total fulfilled criteria
Total points
 x 100% 
 
 In determining the fulfilled points, a score 2 
was given if the Islamic bank discloses 
quantitatively and qualitatively in the financial 
statements and notes to the financial statements. A 
score 1 was given for Islamic bank that discloses 
items in the financial statements or the notes on the 
financial statements quantitatively or qualitatively. 
A score of 0 was given if the Islamic banks did not 
provide the information in their financial 
statements.  The following is the compliance index 
of SFAS 105 used in this study (dewan standar 
akuntansi syariah IAI, 2016):
 
Table 2 SFAS 105 compliance index
 
 
 
 
No SFAS 105 compliance index The referred paragraph in the SFAS 105 
1. Recognition, measurement, and disclosure of 
mudharabah financial products 
In general, explaining the mudharabah financing account 
contained in the Islamic banking balance sheet is 
different from the mudharabah investment account and 
the mudharabah temporary syirkah fund account, this 
explanation refers to paragraphs 12,13 and 38. 
2. The recognition of Islamic Bank as Shahibul Maal 
regarding the account title and total value of 
mudharabah fund investment 
paragraph 12 
3. The recognition of Islamic Bank as Shahibul Maal 
regarding profit sharing of mudharabah based products  
paragraph 20 
4. The recognition of Islamic Bank as Shahibul Maal 
regarding the account title and total value of 
mudharabah fund investment 
paragraph 13,14,15 
5. The recognition of Islamic Bank as Shahibul Maal 
regarding profit sharing of mudharabah based products 
paragraph 21,22,23 
6. The recognition of Islamic Bank as Shahibul Maal 
regarding the account title and total value of 
mudharabah fund investment 
paragraph 38 
7. The recognition of Islamic Bank as Shahibul Maal 
regarding profit sharing of mudharabah based products 
paragraph 38 
8. The recognition of Islamic Bank as Mudharib 
regarding the account title and total value of 
mudharabah fund investment  
paragraph 25, 26 
9. The recognition of Islamic Bank as Mudharib 
regarding profit sharing of mudharabah 
paragraph 29 
10. The recognition of Islamic Bank as Mudharib 
regarding profit sharing of mudharabah based products  
paragraph 25, 26 
11. The recognition of Islamic Bank as Mudharib 
regarding profit sharing of mudharabah based products 
paragraph 27,30 
12. Disclosure of Islamic Bank as Mudharib regarding 
account title and the total amount of  mudharabah fund 
investment 
paragraph 36 dan 39 
13. The recognition of Islamic Bank as Mudharib 
regarding profit sharing of mudharabah based 
products 
paragraph 39  
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Independent variables 
CFO Characteristics 
The characteristics of the CFO tested in this 
study are tenure and educational background. The 
educational background is assessed with a number 
1 if CFO has a formal accounting background at 
undergraduate (S1) or postgraduate (S2/S3), and 0 
if it does not. The tenure is measured by the length 
of CFO tenure in the company. 
 
Effectiveness of audit committee =  
Total fulfilled criteria
Total criteria
 x 100% 
 
Effectiveness of audit committee 
The audit committee's effectiveness is measured 
by its independency, expertise, size, number of 
meetings, and voluntary disclosure on the audit 
committee. The following is the formula to score 
the effectiveness of the audit committee 
In determining the number of criteria/ points 
fulfilled by Islamic banks, this study uses 5 
indicators of the effectiveness of the audit 
committee (Ika & Mohd Ghazali, 2012).  Each 
indicator is measured by analytical content (Sellami 
& Tahari (2017), Glaum et al., (2013), and Al-Akra 
et al., (2010). The following are scoring procedures 
of the analysis content in detail: 
1) The competence of the audit committee 
members is rated 1 if there is at least one 
member of the audit committee with a 
background and experience in accounting 
and finance, and 0 if it does not. 
2) The level of independence is given a score 
of 1 if there are at least 2 members of the 
audit committee from external and 0 if it 
does not. 
3) The size of the audit committee is assigned 
a value of 1 if the audit committee member 
consists of 3 or more members, and 0 if it is 
less. 
4) Audit Committee meetings are measured 
with a value of 1 if the audit committee 
meets at least 5 meetings a year. And 0 if it 
is less than 5 meetings/ year. 
5) Voluntary disclosure is measured with a 
value of 1 if the audit committee reports the 
voluntary disclosure and 0 if it does not. 
 
Stakeholder pressure 
The measurement of stakeholder pressure in 
this study adapted 2 proxies, which are institutional 
share ownership measured using the direct 
ownership method  (El-Halaby & Hussainey, 2016) 
and third-party funds (Farook et al., 2011). The 
following are the formulas: 
1) Institutional share ownership is measured 
using the proportion of institutional share 
ownership. 
2) Third-party funds obtained from temporary 
syirkah financing (mudharabah financing 
funds) and transformed using the natural 
logarithm. 
 
Share ownership proportion =  
Total amount of institusional shares
Total of shares
 x 100%
 
Effectiveness of SSB 
The fourth independent variable is the 
effectiveness of SSB. The SSB effectiveness is 
measured using three dimensions, which are 
competence, size, and cross membership. The 
effectiveness of SSB is assessed by the formula for 
the total points fulfilled from the three dimensions 
of effectiveness divided by the total number of 
points in the dimension multiplied by one hundred 
percent. Hence, the results of these calculations a 
value shows the effectiveness of the SSB used in 
data testing. In determining the fulfilled points for 
each dimension of effectiveness, this study refers to 
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and modifies the research of Farook et al., (2011) 
as follows: 
1) SSB competency was given a score of 1 if 
there is at least 1 SSB member who has an 
educational background in economics, 
management, and accounting and 0 if not. 
2) The size of the SSB is rated 1 if the SSB 
members consist of 3 or more and 0 if less 
than 3. 
3) SBB cross membership is measured by 
giving a value of 1 if there is cross 
membership, and 0 if there is no cross 
membership. 
After analyzing the content of the three 
dimensions of effectiveness, the effectiveness of 
SSB is calculated using the following formula: 
 
SSB Effectiveness =  
Total amount of fulfilled criteria
Total of criteria
 x 100% 
 
Control variables 
The control variables in this study are bank size 
and bank age. Adopting the measurement proposed 
by Sellami & Tahari, (2017), the following are the 
control variable measures:  
1) Size of Islamic banks. This is measured 
using the natural logarithm of total assets 
2) Age of Islamic banks. This is measured by 
calculating the length of time the company 
was founded, starting from the first time it 
was established until the year the research 
was carried out (research year minus the 
year of establishment). 
Data analysis was carried out using multiple 
linear regression with panel data. The research 
model used to test the hypothesis in this study is as 
follows: 
 
CIit = αit + β1BACKR_CFOit + β2MASJBT_CFOit + β3EFEV_ACit + β4STPRES_INSit + 
β5STPRES_TPF3it + β6EFEV_SSBit + β7_SIZEit +  β8_AGEit + εit 
 
Where: 
CI   : Compliance index (SFAS 105) 
BACKR_CFO  : CFO background 
MASJBT_CFO             : CFO length of tenure 
EFEV_AC  : Audit committee effectiveness 
STPRES_INS  : Stakeholder pressure (institutional shares) 
STPRES_TPF  : Stakeholder pressure (third party fund) 
EFEK_SSB  : SSB effectiveness 
SIZE   : Bank size 
AGE   : Bank age 
α    : Constant 
ε               : Error 
 
4. Results and discussion 
The CFO tenure has a positive influence on the 
level of compliance with SFAS 105 
The first hypothesis point a (H1a) predicts that 
the tenure of CFO has a positive effect on the level 
of compliance with SFAS 105. Based on the results 
of the regression analysis this study found that the 
hypothesis is supported as the p-value is 0.042 with 
a coefficient value of 0.0151975. The finding 
supports research conducted by Kim et al., (2007) 
and Geiger & North (2006), which shows that there 
is a significant positive relationship between the 
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tenure of CFO and the application of accounting 
standards. The reason could be that the tenure of top 
management is a reflection of the maturity of the 
organization in decision making.  
 
 
In addition, the CFO who has long served has 
a complete and accurate knowledge of the 
company's reporting system and also has high 
motivation in individuals regarding the presentation 
of quality financial statements. 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics results 
Variables N Mean Min Max St.Dev 
CI 96 0.86 0 1 0.23 
MSJBT_CFO 96 3 1 14 3 
BACKR_CFO 96 0.73 0 1 0.44 
EFEK_KA 96 0.86 0 1 0.26 
STPRES_INS 96 0.97 0.76 1 0.04 
STPRES_DPK3* 96 2,879,996 0 3,181,603 3,296,627 
EFEK_SSB 96 0.59 0 1 0.27 
AGE 96 8 1 26 6 
SIZE* 96 2,963,814 2,654,239 3,210,767 127,381 
 *in thousand Indonesian Rupiah (IDR). 
Another possible reason is CFO who has held 
positions for a longer period are understands the 
internal control system of Islamic banks better, 
presentation of recording, measurement, and 
disclosure of the practice of shariah based contract 
activities, especially mudharabah financing. It is 
also reinforced that the average tenure of the CFO 
of Islamic banking in this study is more than 3 
years. It means the CFOs have already sufficient 
time to understand the reporting process in their 
Islamic banks. 
 
Table 4 Hypothesis result tests 
Variables Coefficients p_value 
MSJBT_CFO 0.0151975 0.042** 
BAKCR_CFO -0.1395701 0.009*** 
EFEV_CA 0.1407097 0.087* 
STPRES_INS -0.3222418 0.532 
STPRES_TPF 0.0185896 0.012** 
EFEV_SSB 0.2750101 0.003*** 
AGE -0.0046052 0.374 
SIZE 0.0153081 0.590 
N  96 
Fstat 0 
R-Squared 39.30% 
***1% statistically significant; **5% statistically significant; *10% statistically significant 
The CFO educational background has a positive 
impact on the level of compliance with SFAS 105 
The first hypothesis point b (H1b) states that the 
educational background of CFO has a positive 
effect on the level of compliance with SFAS 105. 
Based on the results of statistical testing, it is 
obtained that the p-value is 0.009 with a coefficient 
of -0.1395701. This shows that the educational 
background of CFO has a significant negative 
effect on the level of compliance with SFAS 105 so 
that H1b is rejected. The results of this study 
contradict the results of Aier, Comprix, Gunlock, & 
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Lee (2005) and  Hu et al., (2017) who found that 
there was a significant positive relationship 
between the educational background (accounting 
and economics) of CFOs on the quality of financial 
statements. This is presumably because the research 
conducted by Aier et al., (2005)  was conducted 
companies that did not adopt shariah principles. 
Another reason could be that most of the CFO's 
educational background is in accounting and 
general economics, which allows a discrepancy in 
understanding the Islamic accounting standards 
applied by Islamic banking, especially SFAS 105.  
Hu et al., (2017) found that a specific 
educational background can improve the quality of 
financial reporting specifically. Based on tabulation 
data obtained, most of the formal educational 
backgrounds at the CFO of Islamic banks in 
Indonesia are general Accounting rather than 
Islamic Accounting. For example, the CFO of Bank 
Syariah Mandiri (BSM) in 2017 earned a bachelor's 
degree from Agricultural Industry in 1988, the CFO 
of BSM in 2017 earned a master's degree in risk 
management from the faculty of economics in 
2004, BNIS's CFO in 2017 earned a bachelor's 
degree in agriculture in 1989, CFO for BRIS in 
2012-2017 earned a bachelor's degree in economics 
in 1984 and a master's degree in management in 
1999. 
This makes the CFO of Islamic banking have 
more in-depth knowledge of Economics and 
accounting, in general, Islamic accounting. Hence, 
CFOs refers more to general accounting standards 
rather than focusing on Islamic accounting 
standards. Therefore, the importance of many 
aspects of Islamic accounting including disclosures 
related to mudharabah transactions is not fully 
understood. 
 
The influence of the audit committee for the 
level of compliance with SFAS 105 
The second hypothesis H2 states that the 
effectiveness of the audit committee (EFEK_KA) 
has a positive effect on the level of compliance with 
SFAS 105. As a p-value of 0.10 with a coefficient 
value of 0.1407097, this study revealed a 
significant positive influence between the 
effectiveness of the audit committee on the level of 
compliance with SFAS 105 at a significant level of 
10%.  
These results are consistent with Sellami & 
Tahari (2017), Glaum et al., (2013), and Al-Akra et 
al., (2010) who found the existence and 
effectiveness of company audit committees can 
improve the quality of reports through a process of 
monitoring and selecting a quality external audit. It 
can be linked to the main responsibility of the audit 
committee, namely to ensure the integrity of 
financial reporting practices. Islamic banks with an 
effective audit committee will have a higher level 
of accounting reporting compliance with Islamic 
financial accounting standards compared to Islamic 
banks that do not have an effective audit committee. 
It can be concluded that the existence of an 
effective audit committee in Islamic banks will 
increase the supervision quality of top management 
in the financial reporting process.  
One of the important roles of the audit 
committee, in addition to monitoring reporting, is 
to select an external auditor who is competent in 
auditing Islamic banking. Hence, the deficiencies in 
the financial reporting system directed by the CFO 
can be complemented by the auditing system 
carried by the qualified auditors. Based on 
descriptive data, most of the audit committees in the 
companies have been effective with an average 
effectiveness value of 0.86 so that it can be 
concluded that the audit committee has functioned 
optimally in supervising the company's financial 
reporting. So that Islamic banking financial reports 
that have an effective audit committee tend to 
comply with applicable Islamic accounting 
standards. 
 
The influence of stakeholder pressure for the 
level of compliance with SFAS 105  
The stakeholder pressure is proxied by 
institutional ownership and third-party funds. The 
explanation for each of these proxies is as follows: 
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Institutional shares have a negative influence on 
the level of compliance with SFAS 105 
The hypothesis H3a predicts that institutional 
share ownership has a negative effect on the level 
of compliance with SFAS 105. The results of 
statistical testing show that the p-value is 0.532 
with a coefficient value of -0.322418. It means that 
institutional ownership does not affect the level of 
compliance with SFAS 105. So that H3a is rejected. 
The results of this study contradict which found that 
institutional ownership reduces the level of 
compliance with accounting standards. The results 
of this study are also inconsistent with research by 
Eng & Mak (2003) and Mangena & Pike (2005) 
who found that ownership structure affects the level 
of corporate disclosure. El-Halaby & Hussainey 
(2016) found that Islamic banks whose ownership 
structure is held by institutions does not focus on 
disseminating information completely. This is 
because the institution as the main shareholder has 
broad access to this information directly from the 
company. 
Thus, it can be concluded that institutional 
share ownership does not affect the level of 
compliance because most of the data obtained from 
the financial statements of Islamic banks, 
institutional share ownership accounts for more 
than 90% of the shares. This is evidenced by the 
data, namely the mean (average) value of 
institutional ownership amounting to 0.9775404 
(97.75%).  
Most of the institutional ownership hold by 
conventional banks as the holding company. For 
example, 99% of BSM shares are owned by the 
parent institution, namely Bank Mandiri, 98% of 
Sharia BJB shares are owned by PT. BJB Tbk and 
99% of the shares of BNI Syariah are owned by PT. 
BNI Tbk.  
This situation has resulted in at least the 
pressure exerted by the main shareholders to be 
more compliant with Islamic accounting standards 
because the shareholding agencies of Islamic banks 
in Indonesia are mostly holding companies that are 
not engaged in sharia (conventional companies). 
Hence, the compliance with Islamic accounting 
standards is not a top priority desired by the main 
shareholders, but the main shareholders prioritize 
high-profit gains. 
 
Third-party funds have a significant positive 
effect on the level of compliance with SFAS 105  
As the regression test shows p-value is 0.012 
with a coefficient of 0.0185896, thus the third party 
funds have a significant positive effect on the level 
of compliance with SFAS 105 (H3b is accepted). 
The results of this study are consistent with Farook 
et al., (2011) which revealed a positive relationship 
between the proportion of third-party funds and the 
level of disclosure of Islamic bank financial 
reporting. Third-party funds are a reflection for 
Islamic banks to see the extent to which customers 
are interested and trusting in investing their funds 
in Islamic banks for Islamic contract products in 
this study, especially mudharabah contracts. 
One of the main functions of Islamic banking 
is to collect funds from customers through sharia 
contracts. The more third-party funds collected by 
Islamic banking, the higher the responsibility of 
Islamic banking in terms of accountability to the 
owners of these third-party funds. This causes 
Islamic banking to further improve the quality of its 
reporting to increase customer confidence in 
investing in Islamic banking, especially through the 
mudharabah contract. In addition, mudarabah 
products are products that have a high level of risk, 
so customers demand good transparency from 
Islamic banks through financial reporting following 
standards. This aims to minimize the level of risk 
that the customer may bear. This is supported by 
research data which shows that the higher the third 
party funds (mudharabah contract) the better the 
level of compliance of Islamic banks. 
 
Effectiveness of SSD (EFEV_SSD) has a positive 
effect on the level of compliance with SFAS 105 
The last hypothesis H4 states that the 
effectiveness of SSB (EFEV_SSB) has a positive 
effect on the level of compliance with SFAS 105. 
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Based on the results of statistical testing it is found 
that the p-value is 0.003 with a coefficient value of 
0.2750101. This shows that the effectiveness of 
SSB has a significant positive effect on the level of 
compliance with SFAS 105. The results of this 
study support research conducted by Farook et al., 
(2011)which states that the effectiveness of SSB 
can increase the level of compliance with 
accounting standards and information transparency. 
In addition, this study also in line with the result of 
El-Halaby & Hussainey (2016)  which concluded 
that SSB has a positive effect on compliance with 
Islamic accounting standards on Islamic bank 
financial statements. 
In this study, the effectiveness of the SSB is 
quite high, namely 57%. Likewise, if the measure 
of the effectiveness of this SSB is detailed into each 
item that determines the effectiveness of the SSB, 
it shows a fairly high number. Based on the size of 
the SSB, the sample data shows that 95% of the 
sample is companies that have several SSB between 
3 and 5. According to El-Halaby & Hussainey 
(2016), the number of ideal SSB members is 3 to 5 
members.  
This amount can improve SSB performance 
because it is ideal for discussion and coordination 
and allows for diversification of competences for 
SSB members. In addition, 40% of the sample or 
Islamic banks already have SSB members with 
accounting or economic competence who can 
encourage the application of better accounting 
standards. Meanwhile, based on the cross 
membership level of 50% of the sample or 6 out of 
12 Islamic banks have SSB that also have positions 
in other places, according to El-Halaby & 
Hussainey (2016) the existence of SSB that has 
cross membership can increase membership skills 
and competencies so that it provides an 
understanding more comprehensive than the SSB 
monitoring function itself. 
 According to Farook et al., (2011) the 
reputation of SSB in accounting and economics can 
provide a deeper understanding of carrying out the 
supervisory function not only in the field of shariah 
but also on the application of accounting records 
and reporting in the operational disclosure of 
shariah contracts, especially mudharabah 
financing. This hypothesis will be more fulfilled 
and effective if the characteristics of SSB including 
the size of SSB, SSB reputation, and Cross 
Membership of SSB members are fulfilled, then the 
accounting disclosure will be more effective. It is 
proven in this study that the results obtained have a 
positive and significant relationship between the 
effectiveness of SSB and the level of compliance 
with SFAS105. 
 
5. Conclusions  
This study aims to analyze the determinants of 
the application of SFAS 105 in Islamic banking in 
Indonesia. Based on the results of the data analysis, 
it is concluded that the tenure of CFO, the 
effectiveness of the audit committee, stakeholder 
pressure with mudharabah third party fund proxies, 
and the effectiveness of SSB are proven to have a 
positive effect on the application of SFAS 105. 
Meanwhile, the educational background of CFO 
has a negative effect on the application of SFAS 
105, and stakeholder pressure with a proxy of 
institutional ownership does not affect the 
application of SFAS 105. The positive effect of the 
three internal variables shows that the internal 
reporting system for Islamic banking, which 
consists of CFO, the effectiveness of the audit 
committee, and the effectiveness of SSB is an 
important part of the application of SFAS 105 in 
Islamic banking. From these results, it is also 
concluded that the investment account holder for 
mudharabah funds is very important to 
complement the internal reporting system of 
Syariah banking. Mudharabah fund owners can 
pressure Islamic banking to report under applicable 
standards. 
For future research, it is suggested to consider 
CFO and/or SSB non-formal education as a part 
that can also increase knowledge and understanding 
of Islamic accounting standards. Future studies also 
need to develop other more detailed adherence 
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indexes regarding other sources. In addition, the 
reporting supervision system related to the quality 
of internal auditors and the quality of external 
auditors can be used as independent variables that 
may affect the compliance level of company 
financial reports with SFAS 105. This research 
implies that Islamic banking must continue to 
improve the internal reporting supervision system 
through increasing knowledge of CFO, audit 
committee, and SSB so that the accountability and 
transparency of Islamic banking information 
related to the mudharabah contract are getting 
better. 
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